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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AUSTRALIAN
ABORTION LAW: TASMANIA AND THE
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
MARK J RANKIN'
This article follows on from a previous article, 'Contemporary Australian
Abortion Law: The Description ofa Crime and the Negation ofa Woman's
Right to Abortion', published in (2001) 27(2) Monash University Law
Review.
The predominant aim of the 2001 article was to provide an up-to-date
statement a/the law with regard to abortion in each Australian jurisdiction.
However, since that article was published there have been significant
legislative developments in Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory
relating to abortion, with the consequence that the 2001 article no longer
completely satisfies this goal.
This present article aims to satisfy this goal by providing an up-to-date
statement a/the law with regard to abortion in the jurisdictions a/Tasmania
and the Australian Capital Territory. In doing so, comparisons are made
with abortion laws in other Australian jurisdictions, and adopting the
perspective of the 2001 article, inquiry is also made as to the effect of the
recent legislation on the criminality 0/ abortion, and the influence it has
upon a woman '5 right to abortion.
I INTRODUCTION
In the 200 I edition of this Review can be found the article 'Contemporary
Australian Abortion Law: The Description of a Crime and the Negation of a
Woman's Right to Abortion'.' The predominant objective of that article was
professed to be 'to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date statement of the law
with regard to abortion in every jurisdiction in Australia." However, since the
article was published, there have been some further legislative developments in
Tasmania and the ACT. As a consequence, the 2001 article now appears
incomplete.
This present article seeks to rectify this defect, so that read together, this article
and the previous article satisfy the goal of providing a comprehensive and up-to-
date statement of Australian abortion law. The previous article states the law in
the jurisdictions of New South Wales, the Northern Territory, Queensland, South
* Associate Lecturer in Law, School of Law, Flinders University. My thanks go to Associate
Professor Margaret Davies, Flinders Law School, for her comments on earlier drafts of this article.
I Mark J Rankin, 'Contemporary Australian Abortion Law: The Description of a Crime and the
Negation of a Woman's Right to Abortion' (2001) 27(2) MOl/ash University Low Review 229.
Ibid 229 (emphasis added).
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Australia, Victoria, and Western Australia, while this article will deal with the
recent developments in Tasmania and the ACT.'
The new legislation in both jurisdictions will be critically canvassed, and where
appropriate, subject to comparative analysis. Adopting the perspective of the
previous article, inquiry will also be made as to the effect of the legislation on the
criminality of abortion, and the influence it has upon a woman's right to abortion.
Clearly, both issues are inextricably linked, as one cannot have a right to a crime.
As will be seen, the legislation in Tasmania and the ACT provide useful points of
comparison for these questions. The Tasmanian legislation looks backward,
defining abortion as a crime and denying women the right to abortion, while the
ACT has embarked upon novel reform, effectively removing abortion from the
ambit of the criminal law, and as a consequence moving towards a recognition of
a woman's right to' abortion. Following this path of progression, this article will
first discuss the Tasmanian developments before analysing the ACT regime.'
II TASMANIA AND THE 2001 AMENDMENTS
A Background to the 2001 Amendments
At the turn of the 21st century, abortion was a criminal offence in every
jurisdiction in Australia. The legislation that dealt with abortion was to be found
in each jurisdiction's criminal statutes.' Such legislation was modelled (to
varying degrees) on ss 58 and 59 of the United Kingdom's Offences Against the
Person Act 1861.' This legislation defined the act of 'unlawfully' procuring a
'miscarriage' as a felony punishable with lengthy imprisonment.
Under the 1861 Act, if a miscarriage had been unlawfully procured, or an attempt
at such had been made, the woman, any third party who assisted her, and any
supplier of abortifacients utilised therein, could all be charged. The maximum
penalty for the crime was 'penal servitude for life." This severe legislation was
echoed in the criminal statutes of the Australian jurisdictions. Indeed, in some
jurisdictions the statutory provisions on abortion were, and remain, practically
identical to this ancient and draconian United Kingdom legislation."
3 In common with the previous article. this article does not seek to examine abortion practice in
detail, but rather focuses almost exclusively on the law. For discussions on the practice of abortion
see National Health and Medical Research Council, All Information Paper on Termination of
Pregnancy ill Australia (1996) 3-22; Lyndall Ryan .. Margie Ripper and Barbara Buttfleld. We
Women Decide: ",omen's Experience of Seeking Abortion in Queensland, South Australia and
Tasmania 1985-1992 (1994) 15-28; and Kerry Petersen, Abortion Regimes (1993).
4 This article will not study the politics that underlie the legislation. only the enacted law itself. For
a discussion of the politics involved in reforming abortion law see Karen Coleman, 'The Politics
ofAbortion in Australia: Freedom. Church. and State' (1988) 29 Feminist Review 75. Also see the
description of the role of the Women's Electoral Lobby in the recent legislative reforms: (2003)
Women's Electoral Lobby (WEL) Australia Inc <http://www.wel.org.au> at 7 April 2003.
5 In West Australia and the ACf. there also existed provisions on abortion outside the criminal
statutes, but the fundamental law with regard to abortion was still found in the criminal statutes in
both jurisdictions.
24 & 25 Viet. c tno. ss 58-9.
Offences Against the Person Act 186/(UK) c 100. s 58.
See. ego the relevant NSW and Victorian legislation: Crimes Act /900 (NSW) ss 82-4; Crimes Act
/958 (Vic) ss 65-6.
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Fortunately for Australian women seeking abortion services, throughout the later
half of the 20th century each Australian jurisdiction, with the exception of
Tasmania, embarked upon abortion law reform, either through judicial initiative
or through legislative amendment. Although abortion remained a serious crime,
these reforms expressly recognised that some abortions could be lawful, and
sought to clarify the circumstances under which an abortion would be considered
to be lawful.
In Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland, such clarification was provided
by the judiciary,' whereas in South Australia, the Northern Territory and Western
Australia, the legislature took the lead in this respect.W In the Australian Capital
Territory, a combination of both judicial and legislative actions were brought to
bear on that jurisdiction's abortion law."
A discussion of all of these various reforms has been previously dealt with
'
! and
will not be repeated here unless relevant to the jurisdictions presently under
scrutiny. For present purposes, it will suffice to say that by the turn of the 21st
century, each Australian jurisdiction had embarked upon a mode of abortion law
reform, so that clarification of the law had been achieved to some extent. That is,
this had occurred in every jurisdiction except Tasmania. At the turn of the 21st
centuryTasmania had yet to provide anyjudicial or legislative clarificationof its
abortion law.
Tasmanian abortion law was to be found in ss 134 and 135 of the Criminal Code
Act 1924 (Tas); legislation derivative of ss 58 and 59 of the UK 1861 Act.
Sections 134 and 135 stated as follows:
134. (I) Any woman who, being pregnant, unlawfully administers to herself,
with intent to procure herown miscarriage, any poison or other noxious thing
or with suchintent unlawfully uses any instrument orother means whatsoever,
is guilty of a crime.
(2) Any person who, with intent to procure the miscarriage of a woman,
whether she be pregnant or not, unlawfully administers to her,or causes her to
take, any poison or other noxious thing, or with such intent unlawfully uses
any instrument or other means whatsoever, is guilty of a crime.
135. Any person who unlawfully supplies to or procures for any other person
anything whatever, knowing that it is intended to be unlawfully used with
intentto procure the miscarriage of a woman, whether she is or is not pregnant,
is guilty of a crime.
9 See respectively R v Davidson [1969] VR 667; R v Wald [1971]3 DCR (NSW) 25; R v Bayliss
and Cullen (1986) 9 Qld Lawyer Reps 8. The legal situation in NSW has changed since R v Wahl
(albeit in a minor way) as a consequence of the Court of Appeal decision of CES v Superclinics
(Australia) Pty Ltd (1995) 38 NSWLR 47 [Superclinlcs'[, It would not be unreasonable to assume
that Superclinics would be followed in both Victoria and Queensland.
to See respectively Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 82A; Criminal Code Act /983 (NT)
s 174; and Criminal Code Act 1913 (WA) s 199, amended by Acts Amendment (Abortion) Act
/998 (WA).
1\ Such developments will be detailed later in the article.
12 For a detailed discussion of these reforms see Rankin, above n 1.
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Although there had been no legislative or judicial explanation of these provisions,
it had been assumed, given the similarity of the relevant legislation in Tasmania
and Queensland, that Tasmanian courts would follow the lead of Queensland
courts I) and allow lawful abortions according to the criteria set out in R v
Davidson." Accordingly, it was assumed that an abortion would be lawful in
Tasmania if performed by a medical practitioner, with an honest belief on
reasonable grounds that the operation was necessary to preserve the woman
concerned from a 'serious danger to her life or physical or mental health (not
being merely the normal dangers of pregnancy and childbirth)'." However, this
was by no means certain, and the Tasmanian situation with respect to abortion
law was still largely a mystery at the end of the 20th century.
This all changed in December 2001, when the Tasmanian Parliament passed the
Criminal Code Amendment Act (No 2) 2001 (Tas), which sought to clarify the
circumstances under which an abortion would be deemed to be lawful. This Act
came into effect upon receiving the royal assent on 24 December 2001.
B A New Regime or the Same Old Story?
The significant provisions of the 2001 Act are ss 4 and 5. Section 5 seeks to
alleviate the concerns of the Tasmanian medical profession. The profession had,
by and large, refused to perform abortions by late 2001 because of a perceived
uncertainty as to whether or not they would be acting illegally in providing
abortion services." This state of affairs was the impetus for the calling of
Parliament out of session and the passing of the Act. J7
The concerns of the medical profession with regard to the possible laying of
charges under the old law are effectively removed by s 5, which states:
No prosecution lies against any person in relation to a termination of
pregnancy performed before the commencement of this Act by a registered
medical practitioner at a public hospital or private medical establishment.
This retrospective pardon for medical practitioners is accompanied by major
amendments to Tasmanian abortion law. Section 4 enacts such amendments,
which were incorporated directly into the Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas)."
13 Ibid 230, 242.
14 [1969] VR 667. This Victorian Supreme Court decision was followed in the District Court of
Queensland in R v Bayliss and Cutten (1986) 9 Qld Lawyer Reps 8. See also K v T (1983) Qd R
396.
15 R v Davidson [1969] VR 667, 672. This decision has been expanded upon by the subsequent
decisions in R v Wald [1971] 3 DCR (NSW) 25; R v Bayliss and CIII/ell (1986) 9 Qld Lawyer
Reps 8; Superctinics (1995) 38 NSWLR 47, but the basic principle remains the same.
16 See M Paire, 'Abortion Reform Celebrated', Mercury News (Tasmania), 22 December 2001, 4;
Editorial, 'Abortion Law Clarified in Tasmania (Round Up: Law and Policy)' (2002) 10
Reproductive Health Matters 199; Jenny Ejlak, tnkwet. (2003) Women's Electoral Lobby (WEL)
Australia Inc <http://www.wel.org.au/inkwellink0204/tasab.htm> at 7 April 2003.
17 See Ejlak, above n 16. This site also provides all interesting description of the politics involved in
WEL's campaign for reform.
18 See Criminal Code Amendment Act (No 2) 2001 (Tas) s 4, which states: 'The amendments effected
by this section have been incorporated into the authorised version of the Criminal Code Act /924'.
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Under the new law abortion remains a serious crime, due to the continued
existence of ss 134 and 135 of the Criminal Code Act /924 (Tas).· The 2001
amendments affected these sections, but only in minor syntactical ways.
Specifically, the phrase 'whether she be pregnant or not' was deleted from s 134(2),
and the phrase 'whether she is or is not pregnant' was deleted from s 135.
This change achieves very little as the deleted phrases were largely superfluous.
That is, the addition of the phrase 'whether she be pregnant or not', after the term
'woman', adds nothing to s 134(2). Put simply, the definition of 'woman' includes
a pregnant woman as well as a non-pregnant woman; one does not cease to be a
woman merely by becoming pregnant. Thus, deleting the phrase from s 134(2)
(and the equivalent phrase from s 135) achieves nothing of significance.
Furthermore, the sections essentially createoffences of attempts, andan intention
to procure a miscarriage is an intention to procure a miscarriage, whether or not
the woman is pregnant, so specifying this was redundant in the first place.
The significant amendments to the law are to be found in the newly created s 164
of the Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas). This section, titled 'Medical termination of
pregnancy', outlines what constitutes a 'legally justified' termination of
pregnancy. Section. 164(1) makes it clear that a 'legally justified' termination of
pregnancy is not a crime.
As to what constitutes 'legally justified', the new section is a curious blend of the
South Australian and Western Australian legislation dealing with abortion.
Section 164(2) states that an abortion is legally justified if:
(a) two registered medical practitioners have certified, in writing, that the
continuation of the pregnancy would involve greater risk of injury to the
physical or mental health of the pregnant woman than if the pregnancy were
terminated; and
(b) the woman has given informed consent unless it is impracticable for her to
do so.
An abortion must therefore satisfy two tests in order to be deemed to be legally
justified: (I) a balancing of risks test; and (2) an informed consent test. The risks
test is a South Australian innovation, and the informed consent test is adopted
from Western Australia. Indeed, s 164(2)(a) effectively duplicates the balancing
of risks formula found in s 82A(l)(a)(i) of the South Australian Act," while
s 164(2)(b) reproduces the informed consent model created by the recent Western
Australian amendments." This failure by the Tasmanian Parliament to adopt a
novel approach to abortion law reform is regrettable, as it ultimately results in
repeating the mistakes of others, rather than learning from them, and thereby
19 The 'SouthAustralian Act' referred to is the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA).
10 The 'Western Australian amendments' refersto the Criminal Code Act 1913 (WA)s 199,amended
by the Acts Amendment (Aborrion) Act 1998 (WA), which also provides for amendments to the
HealthAcr 1911 (WA).
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constitutes a lost opportunity to embark upon progressive reform. Indeed, the
level of borrowing from the legislation in the other 'reform?' jurisdictions is so
great that it is appropriate to discuss the 200 I Tasmanian amendments by
reference to the legislation which it emulates.
III A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
A The South Australian Influence
Looking first at the South Australian influenced s 164(2)(a), there do exist minor
differences between the Tasmanian legislation and the 'parent' South Australian
legislation. For instance, s 82A(l)(a)(i) of the South Australian Act also refers to
a 'greater risk. to the life of the pregnant woman', a phrase omitted from the
Tasmanian s 164(2)(a), which only provides for health risks. However, this
distinction is not important as the inclusion of a life risk is redundant when health
risks are included. That is, a risk to one's life is clearly also a risk to one's health.
The South Australian legislation also differs in that it allows for a lawful
termination on the grounds of foetal abnormality," while the Tasmanian
legislation is silent on this issue. However, this is not overly significant because
the fact of foetal abnormality would certainly constitute a factor that the requisite
two medical practitioners may consider in coming to a determination as to the
risk to the pregnant woman's mental health.
As to what other factors the two medical practitioners may refer in coming to
their conclusion concerning the relevant risk, the Tasmanian legislation follows
the South Australian legislation by granting the medical practitioners a wide
discretion in this respect. Indeed, the Tasmanian legislation allows the medical
practitioners to cast an even wider net than the South Australian legislation,"
permitting them to 'take account of any matter which they consider to be relevant'
in assessing the risk to the pregnant woman's health." Furthermore, unlike the
South Australian legislation, there is no express onus upon the Tasmanian
medical profession to act in 'good faith' in coming to a decision as to the
lawfulness of a particular abortion.
When combined with the absence of any guidance by the law as to the degree of
risk of injury required, Tasmanian law thus effectively frees the Tasmanian
medical profession from external scrutiny with respect to determining the
relevant health risks under s I64(2)(a). This effectively grants the Tasmanian
medical profession quasi-judicial status, as the Tasmanian government has
21 I use this term 10 describe thosejurisdictions that have amended the original legislation dealing
with abortion.
22 See Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 82A(1)(a)(ii). Fora discussion of theanalogous
UK provisions see D Morgan, 'Abortion: The Unexamined Ground' ll990j Criminal UIW Rel'iew
687.
2J The SouthAustralian Act allows themedical practitioners to takeaccountof the pregnant woman's
'actual or reasonably foreseeable environment' - see Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA)
s 82A(3).
24 Crimtna! Code Act 1924 (Tas)s 164(3).
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thereby delegated the role of deciding upon the legality of an abortion to the
Tasmanian medical profession.
The medical profession thus become the 'legal gatekeepers' with regard to
abortion law." This is unfortunate for two reasons: (l) the medical profession is
not necessarily qualified to play such a quasi-judicial role;" and (2) it effectively
excludes a women's right to abortion."
In common with South Australian law, under Tasmanian law the only 'right'
granted is to the medical profession to decide whether or not an abortion is
lawful, and to perform the abortion under certain conditions." Judging from
decisions in other jurisdictions, it is likely that the Tasmanian judiciary will be
reluctant to question the medical profession in making any decision as to the
lawfulness of an abortion." Unfortunately, this means that the medical profession
may 'impose on to women their own views of when abortion is permissible.?"
As to the conditions under which lawful abortions may be performed in
Tasmania, such conditions are even more relaxed than in South Australia.
Specifically. there is no requirement in Tasmania to perform the abortion in a
'prescribed hospital', nor are there any residency or reporting requirements;"
which are conditions contained in the South Australian legislation."
On the other hand, the Tasmanian legislation is more restrictive than the South
Australian legislation in that at least one of the medical practitioners making the
relevant determination must specialise in obstetrics or gynaecology." This serves
25 See Kerry Petersen, 'Abortion: Medicalisation and Legal Gatekeeping' (2000) 7 Journal of Law
and Medicine 267.269-71. Also see Regina Graycar and Jenny Morgan, "Unnatural Rejection of
Womanhood and Motherhood": Pregnancy, Damages and the Law: A Note on CES v Superclinics
(AI/st) Pty Ltd' (1996) 18 Sydney UIW Review 323, 333,
26 See John Keown, Abortion. Doctors, and the UM: Some Aspects oj the Legal Regulation oj
Abortion ill England from 1803-1982 (1988) 50-80.
27 See Petersen, above n 25. 271; Lynda Crowley-Cyr, 'A Century of Remodelling: The Law of
Abortion in Review' (2000) 7 Journal ofLaw and Medicine 252, 257-8; Susanne Davies, 'Captives
of their Bodies: Women, Law and Punishment, 1880's-1980's' in Diane Kirby (ed), Sex, Power:
and JII,Hice: Historical Perspectives of Law ill Australia (1995) 99, 109; Sheila Mcl.ean. 'Women:
Rights, and Reproduction', in Sheila McLean (ed). Legal Issues in Human Reproduction (1989)
213,227; Kathleen McDonnell, Not all Easy Choice: A Feminist Re-examines Abortion (1984)
126-30; and Linda Clarke. 'Abortion: A Rights Issue?' in Robert Lee and Derek Morgan (eds).
Birthrights: Law lind Ethics at the Beginnings of Life (1989) ISS. 163-6,
28 In common with all other Australian jurisdictions. Tasmanian law also grants members of the
medical profession the 'right' to refuse to participate in any way in an abortion (see Criminal Code
Act 1924 (Tas) s 164(7». Fortunately, this allowance for a conscientious objection does not extend
to cases where 'treatment .., is necessary to save the life of a pregnant woman or to prevent her
immediate serious physical injury' (Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 164(8»,
29 See Paton v British Advisory Service Trustees [1979] I QB 276, 281; Reg v Smith (101111) [19731
I WLR 1510, 1512 (Scarman U); K v T [1983] Qd R 396. 398 - comments made in these cases
are evidence of the judiciary's extreme reluctance to question the medical profession with respect
to any such decision,
30 Clarke, above n 27, 166.
31 However, in common with the law in South Australian, in Tasmania the two medical practitioners
must certify in writing that they believe the continuance of the pregnancy poses a greater risk of
injury to the health of the pregnant woman than if the pregnancy were terminated-see Crimil/al
Code Act !924 (Tas) s 164(2)(a», which may produce an analogous result 10 the South Australian
reporting requirements.
u See Criminal UIW Consolidouon Act 1935 (SA) s 82A( I )(a) for the 'prescribed hospital' condition,
and Crill/intll Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 82A(2) for the residency requirements.
.lJ Crimina! Code At" 1924 (Tas) s 164(5).
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to delay the process of accessing abortion services in Tasmania. Fortunately for
Tasmanian women seeking abortion, the Tasmanian restriction in this respect
does not go as far as the Northern Territory legislation, which requires an
obstetrician or gynaecologist to perform the abortion." In Tasmania, any
registered medical practitioner may lawfully perform an abortion."
At this stage, it must be emphasised that, like all Australianjurisdictions, it is only
medical practitioners that may lawfully perform abortions in Tasmania. The law
in Tasmania expressly and unambiguously provides for a medical monopoly with
regard to the practice of abortion." In common with all Australian jurisdictions,
Tasmanian abortion law provides for the medicalisation of abortion.
However, despite the apparent intention of the Tasmanian Parliament to create a'
medical monopoly in this respect, it could nonetheless be argued that s 51(I) of
the Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) constitutes a fundamental ability for non-
medical practitioners to perform operations, and that this could extend to
abortions. This section allows a non-medical practitioner to perform a 'surgical
operation' 'in good faith and with reasonable care and skill' when the operation is
'reasonable, having regard to all the circumstances', and provided the operation is
performed with the consent and for the 'benefit' of the woman concerned."
Similarly, it appears by virtue of s 165(2) of the Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas),
that if a woman's life is threatened by the continuance of her pregnancy, then
anyone acting in good faith for the preservation of her life may terminate her
pregnancy by any means available."
Neither s 51(I) nor s 165(2) were affected by the 200 I amendments, which means
that these sections, which seem to provide further statutory defences to the crime
of abortion, may yet have significant implications for abortion law and practice
in Tasmania. Indeed, further reform might be achieved by certain individuals (eg
qualified nurses or midwives) performing abortions, thereby encouraging
prosecution, and subsequently attempting to avail themselves of these statutory
defences." It remains to be seen how Tasmanian courts would react to ss 51(1)
and 165(2) being used in this manner, however it should be noted that the first
major abortion decision of the 20th century, that of R v BOllme" (the decision that
first made it clear that it was possible to perform a lawful abortion), was the result
of just such a test case.
34 Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s 174(1)(a).
35 Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 164(6).
36 See Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tes) s 164(6), which states: 'A legally justified termination can only
be performed by a registered medical practitioner',
37 The full text of Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 51(1) is as follows: 'It is lawful for a person to
perform in good faith and with reasonable care and skill a surgical operation upon another person.
with his consent and for his benefit. if the performance of such operation is reasonable. having
regard to all the circumstances'.
38 The full text of Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 165(2) is as follows: 'No one commits a crime
who by any means employed in good faith for the preservation of its mother's life causes the death
of any such child before or during its birth'.
39 A means of possible reform unavailable in South Australia. which has no similar statutory
defences to Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) ss 51(1).165(2),
40 [1939] t KB 687.
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B The Western Australian Influence
Turning to the informed consent requirement created by s 164(2)(b), in defining
the phrase 'informed consent', Tasmania replicates the Western Australian model.
The Tasmanian s 164(9) defines informed consent as follows:
'informed consent' means consent given by a woman where -
(a) a registered medical practitioner has provided her with counselling about
the medical risk of termination of pregnancy and of carrying a pregnancy to
term; and
(b) a registered medical practitioner has referred her to counselling about other
matters relating to termination of pregnancy and carrying a pregnancy to term;
'woman' means any female person of any age.
Sections 164(9)(a) and (b) are almost identical to ss 334(5)(a) and (b) of the
Health Act 1911 (WA). The only significant difference between the Tasmanian
and Western Australian 'informed consent' provisions is that the Tasmanian
legislation is less restrictive, in that the medical practitioner providing the
relevant counselling and referrals may also perform the abortion, whereas in
Western Australia s/he may not do SO.~I In addition, in Western Australia the
medical practitioner must also inform the woman concerned 'that appropriate and
adequate counselling will be available to her should she wish it upon termination
of pregnancy or after carrying the pregnancy to term'," whereas no such future
obligation is placed upon Tasmanian medical practitioners.
The Tasmanian provisions are also less restrictive than the Western Australian
parent legislation with respect to the fact that there are no further restrictions in
Tasmania concerning performing an abortion upon a woman under J6 years of
age, whereas in Western Australia additional restrictions are placed upon this
practice." Furthermore, in Western Australia there exist extra restrictions on the
practice of abortion that arise when an abortion is to be performed on a woman'
who is more than 20 weeks pregnant," whereas in Tasmania there exists no stated
time limit for lawful abortions; although one may reasonably assume that
viability is the cut-off point in this respect."
However, notwithstanding the fact that the Tasmanian 'informed consent'
provisions viewed in isolation appear less restrictive than the parent provisions in
Western Australia, it must be recognised that the overall result of the 200 I
amendments is that the law in Tasmania is far more restrictive than it is in
Western Australia. In Western Australia, the test for a lawful abortion is informed
41 See Health Act 19JJ (WA) s 334(6).
41 Health Ad 1911 (WA) s 334(5)(c).
·n See Health Act /911 (WA) ss 334(8), (9). Also see Criminal Code Acl /983 (NT) s 174(4)(b) for
similar restrictions with regard to women under the age of 16 in the Northern Territory.
44 See Health Act 1911 (WA) s 334(7).
45 There is no specific provision expressly stating this. but it may be implied from the law in other
jurisdictions, common law decisions (eg C I" S [1987] I All ER 1230: Rance v Mid-DOIl"IIs Hetllth
Authority [19911 I QB 587), and by virtue of Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 166(2). This issue
of viability being the cut-off point for lawful abortions will be discussed in further detail below.
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consent;" there is no additional requirement that two medical practitioners must
certify in writing that they have applied the appropriate balancing of risks
formula to the situation,
IV A LOST OPPORTUNITY FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM
The result of incorporating elements of both the South Australian and Western
Australian legislation is a more restrictive abortion regime than exists in either of
these other 'reform' jurisdictions. Tasmanian abortion law is more restrictive than
Western Australian abortion law because it requires the certification of two
medical practitioners with regard to the balancing of risks involved, and it is more
restrictive than South Australian abortion law because it also requires the
provision of counselling according to the informed consent criteria."
One may nonetheless conclude that the Tasmanian amendments should be
tentatively welcomed, if only because they have resulted in some clarification of
the law, and thus provided enough legal certainty to the Tasmanian medical
profession so that they may resume providing abortion services. However, the
fact that the 200 I amendments create, or rather maintain, a restrictive abortion
regime should not be overlooked."
It is also of concern that there remains uncertainty as to how the new law sits with
the old statutory defences contained within ss 51(I) and 165(2). In particular, one
may reasonably question whether, and if so in what way, the common law
decisions of the eastern states remain applicable to Tasmania. That is, the
defences offered by ss 51(1) and 165(2) appear to illicit the applicability of these
decisions, as occurred with regard to similar provisions in Queensland."
However, the most important point to recognise in coming to a conclusion as to
the overall worth of the 200 I amendments, is that the 200 I Tasmanian
amendments have not changed the fundamental character of abortion law in that
4l'l It should be noted that there exist other grounds for performing lawful abortions in West Australia
(see Health Act 1911 (WA) s 334 (b)-(d»), However given that informed consent is a legitimate
ground in itself (see Health Act 19/1 (WA) s 334 (a)), the use of these other grounds is minimal.
..7 It should be noted however that medical practitioners throughout Australia are legally required to
provide information and advice concerning any proposed medical procedure. Consequently, the
provision of advice concerning the medical risks of abortion must be provided irrespective of
whether or not the relevant abortion law demands it. For example, the main provider of abortion
services in South Australia, the Pregnancy Advisory Centre, has adopted a policy of providing
counselling along similar lines to the counselling described under s I64(9) of the Tasmanian Act,
despite any legislative demand to do so,
4K Similar conclusions are made by WEL. which summed up the 2001 amendments as follows: 'there
is now greater legal clarity, although no greater access to the service for women', Ejlak, above n 16.
..9 See R \' Bayliss and Cutten (1986) 9 Qld Lawyer Reps 8, in which it was held that the equivalent
Queensland provision (Crimina! Code Al.'t 1899 (Qld) s 282). provided the means by which the
court could follow the decisions of R v Davidson [1969J VR 667 and R v Wald [197113 OCR
(NSW) 25, Of course, it should be noted that the Tasmanian ss 51(I) and 165(2) are far more
likely to be read down in relation to abortion. given that Tasmania has adopted specific abortion
law. In addition, a court may say that 'reasonable' in s 51(I) has to be read in light of other law.
specifically current Tasmanian abortion law.
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state. Although medical practitioners may now lawfully perform abortions under
the provisions of s 164, abortion remains a crime; a medical monopoly of the
practice is preserved; and there continues to be a failure to recognise a woman's
right to abortion.
This unfortunate state of affairs is a result of the fact that the 200 I amendments
merelyrehash previousreforms in SouthAustralia andWestern Australia, neither
of which frame the abortion decision in terms of a woman's right. Following the
lead of these jurisdictions, the 200 I Tasmanian amendments merely provide for
the medicalisation of abortion. Consequently, under Tasmanian law the abortion
decision is now clearly in medical hands, and the only 'rights' with regard to
abortion are possessed and exercised by the medical profession. Moreover, if a
woman seeks to terminate her pregnancy outside the controls of the medical
profession, she can still be charged with the serious crime of procuring her own
abortion." As the Women's Electoral Lobby state: '[tjhe key issue is that legally,
doctors decide whether a woman can have an abortion - women do not have
control over the decision.": In this sense, the benefit to the Tasmanian medical
profession has come at the expense of Tasmanian women, as Tasmanian abortion
law serves to deny women any rights with regard to abortion.
The failure of the Tasmanian Parliament to provide innovation on the issue is
therefore cause for deep regret. The Tasmanian Parliament, sitting at the
beginning of the 21st century, had a golden opportunity to embark upon
progressive reform that focused on the rights of the pregnant woman concerned.
Showing a lack of insight and initiative, the Tasmanian Parliament instead chose
to look backward and simply copy the mistakes of others.
The present state of Tasmanian abortion law is therefore no cause for celebration,
and indeed before the ink is dry on the 200 I amendments there should be a
campaign for further reform of the law. A campaign focused not upon who may
lawfully perform abortions, but rather upon addressing the human rights
violations that occur as a result of denying women the right to make their own
reproductive choices." Such a campaign must necessarily have as its central
platform the removal of abortion from Tasmania's Criminal Code, because so
long as abortion remains a crime, it can never be a right.
50 See Criminal Code ACI 1924 (Tas) s [34( l ).
5\ Aboven 16.
52 For discussions of the various human rights violations that occur as a result of maintaining
restrictive abortion laws see Ellen Willis, 'Abortion: Is a Woman a Person?', in Ann Snitow,
Christine Stansell and Sharon Thompson (eds), Desire: The Politics of Sexuality (1984) 92, 92-
6; C Neff, 'Woman,Womb, and Bodily Integrity' (1991) 3 Yale Journal of Lawand Feminism 327,
337; Rosalind Petchesky, Abortion and Woman's Choice: The Slate. Sexuality, and Reproductive
Freedom (1984) 374-5, 378. 387; Katherine Kolbert, 'A Reproductive Rights Agenda for the 1990's'
(1989) I Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 3, 3; Frances Olsen, 'Unravelling Compromise', in
Patricia Smith (ed), Feminist Jurisprudence (1993) 335, 340.
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This last point leads to a discussion of the ACT reforms of 2002. As a
consequence of these reforms the ACT has moved towards the recognition of a
woman's right to abortion, and as a result now possesses the most liberal abortion
law in the country." Ironically, the last time the ACT Parliament decided to
legislate on the subject of abortion in 1998, the resulting regime could be
described as the most reactionary in Australia." Fortunately, the ACT has now
come full circle, and the notable result of the 2002 reforms is that the ACT is the
first Australian jurisdiction to approach the holy grail of abortion law reform; the
removal of abortion from the realm of the criminal law. The significance of this
achievement cannot be overstated, and the consequent new abortion regime in the
ACT is cause for celebration. The ACT Parliament is to be commended for
lighting the way for all Australian jurisdictions.
To adequately illuminate the achievement of the.ACT Parliament in this respect,
it is necessary to briefly outline the legal situation that existed in the ACT prior
to the 2002 reforms."
Background to 2002
In common with the jurisdictions of New South Wales, Queensland, and Victoria,
the abortion provisions in the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) prior to 2002 were copied
from ss 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (UK)." Under
ss 44, 45, and 46 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) abortion was defined as a serious
crime, with severe penalties." However, it was generally believed that the New
South Wales decisions" were applicable to the ACT," and hence the practice of
abortion in the ACT functioned under this belief, resulting in relatively easy
access to abortion services."
This situation of relative stability was unbalanced in 1998 by the passing of the
Health Regulation (Maternal Health Information) Act 1998 (ACT)." The main
purposes of this Act were professed to be 'to ensure that adequate and balanced
medical advice and information are given to a woman who is considering an
53 Prior to 2002, one could say that West Australian abortion law could lay claim to this title - see
Rankin, above n I, 247; Alison Duxbury and Christopher Ward, 'The International Law
Implications of Australian Abortion Law' (2000) 23 University of New Smith Wales Law Journal
I, 5; Lisa Teasdale, 'Confronting the Fear of Being "Caught": Discourses on Abortion in Western
Australia' (1999) 22 University of New South Wales Law }ollmal60, 71; Leslie Cannold. The
Abortion Myth: Feminism, Morality, and the Hard Choices Women Make (1998) 98.
5-1- See Rankin, above n I, 251.
55 A more detailed analysis of the pre-2002 ACT situation can be found in Rankin, above n 1,249-
51.
56 To be more precise, they were copied from the NSW provisions, which in turn were copied from
the 1861 UK Act.
57 Note: prior to 2002 the relevant sections were ss 42-4. From January 2002 they became s544-46
(but remained otherwise unchanged). On 9 September 2002, the new s 44 was substituted for the
old ss 44~6, and on 9 December 2002, s 44 expired altogether.
58 See R v Wald [1971] 3 DCR (NSW) 25; Superctinics (1995) 38 NSWLR 47.
59 See Rankin. above n I, 249.
60 See National Health and Medical Research Council, above n 3. 5-6.
61 For a discussion of the initial Bill see Duxbury and Ward, above n 53, 3-4.
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abortion'," and 'to ensure that a decision by a woman to proceed or not to proceed
with an abortion is carefully considered.>' The legislation demanded that a
medical practitioner 'properly, appropriately and adequately' provide a woman
contemplating an abortion with advice concerning medical risks" and foetal
development." The medical practitioner was also obliged to offer the woman
referral to counselling." A statement certifying that the requisite information and
advice had been provided would then have to be completed prior to an abortion
being performed."
Much of the information and advice to be provided was similar to that demanded
by the informed consent provisions in Western Australia, and since 200 I, in
Tasmania. However, the issue of addressing foetal development was a
controversial innovation, as the legislation made it mandatory for medical
practitioners to provide women seeking an abortion with a pamphlet containing
information concerning this," which might include pictures of foetuses at
different stages of gestation." The original pamphlet did not contain such
pictures, but an attempt was made to create such a pamphlet by the use of the
regulatory power conferred by the Act," resulting in the Maternal Health
Information Regulations 1999 (ACT), which was cause for concern for some
time."
Other aspects of the 1998 Act that were alarming were the conscientious objector
clauses, which allowed individuals to not only refuse to participate in abortions,"
but also to refuse to provide advice and/or counselling concerning abortion," and
most worrying, to refuse to refer a patient to someone who would provide the
advice, counselling, and/or service desired." Given the religious and moral
connotations abortion has for some people in our society, it would seem
reasonable to permit such individuals to decline to participate in abortions."
However, to allow such individuals to refuse to refer their patients to people who
could actually treat them is clearly 'inconsistent with a medical practitioner's
ethical and legal obligations to properly advise his/her patient."
62 Health Regulation (Maternal Health lnformation} Act 1998 (ACT) s 3(a).
63 Heattli Regulation (Maternal Health Illformatio/l) Act 1998 (ACT) s 3(b).
M Health Regulation (Maternal Health IlIj;mllation) Act 1998 (ACT) s B(I )(a)(i)-(iii).
65 Health Regulation (Maternal Health lnjormation) Act 1998 (ACT) s 8( I)(a)(iv).
66 Health Regulation (Maternal Health Information) Act 1998 (ACT) s B(I )(b)(i) and (ii).
67 See Health Regulation [Maternal Health lnfannation) Act 1998 (ACT) s 7. Such conditions were
not required to be mel if the person performing the operation 'honestly believes that a medical
emergency exists involving the woman' - Health Regulation tMaternat Health h!!'ormatioll) Act
1998 (ACT) s 7(2). The term 'medical emergency' was defined under the Act as a medical
condition thai 'makes it necessary 10 perform an abortion to avert substantial impairment of a
major bodily function of the woman and does not allow reasonable time to comply' with the
requirements of the Act - Health Regulation (Maternal Health Information] Act 1998 (ACT) s 5.
6:'\ Health Regulation (Maternal Health Information) Act 1998 (ACT) s 8( IHc), (d), (e).
69 Health Regulation (Maternal Health lnjonnation) Act 1998 (ACT) s 14(4).
70 See Health Regulation (Marel'l/al Health Illformation) Act 1998 (ACT) s 16.
71 See Rankin, above n I. 250.
n Health Regulation [Maternal Health Iliformatiun) Act /998 (ACT) s 12{a).
B Health Regulation (Materna! Health lnjarmcuion] Act 1998 (ACT) s 12(b).
H Health Regulation (Maternal Health lntormation} Act /998 (ACT) s l2(c).
75 Of course, that is unless the woman's life is under threat, in which case such a refusal would be
unreasonable and unethical.
7(1 Rankin, above n 1,251.
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Curiously, the 1998 Act purported to have no effect on the lawfulness of abortions
in the ACT," but this is nonsense, as not only did it have a clear effect on
practice," but it also prescribed criminal sanctions for contravention of certain
provisions." Regardless of legal effect, the 1998 Act restricted access to abortion
services and served to delay the process of obtaining an abortion," with
consequent health risks to the woman concerned." To repeat my previous
conclusion concerning the overall result of the 1998 Act:
(I) it serverd] to discourage medical practitioners from referring women for
abortion; (2) it act[ed] as a disincentive for medical practitioners to perform
abortions; (3) it serve[d] to delay the process of obtaining an abortion, thereby
increasing the maternal health risks of the procedure; and (4) it [sought] to
remove any autonomy that the woman concerned may have had under the
previous regime. ~2
In other words, the 1998 Act was 'a clear victory for the anti-choice movement'."
Fortunately, this state of affairs did not last long, and the winds of change soon
began to blow through the ACT Parliament.
VI A CHANGE IN THE AIR?
The repeal process began in late 2001, with the Executive issuing the Maternal
Health Information Regulations Repeal 2001 (ACT), which repealed the 1999
Regulations that had attempted to incorporate foetal pictures into the requisite
pamphlet. Although a commendable step in itself, the truly significant reform
was to occur in 2002, with the passing of the Crimes (Abolition of Offence of
Abortion) Act 2002 (ACT).
77 The Act specifically states that 'the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an abortion ... is not affected by
either the compliance by any person or the failure by any person to comply with a provision of this
Act' - see Health Regulation (Maternal Health Information) Act 1998 (ACT) s 4. See also paragraph
two of the preamble to the Health Regulation (Maternal Health Infonl1atioll) Act 1998 (ACT).
7H Rankin, above n I. 251.
79 See, eg, Health Regulation (Maternal Health tnfonnation) Act /998 (ACT) ss 6(1), 6(2), which
prescribe imprisonment as the penalty for failure to obey that section.
80 This delay factor was exacerbated by the fact that once all the information, advice, relevant
pamphlets, and offers of referrals have been given, the woman and the medical practitioner
concerned must make a joint declaration to that effect, stating the date and time {see Health
Regulation (Marernal Health Information) Act 1998 (ACT) s 9). The woman must then wait not
less than 72 hours after signing this declaration before presenting herself at an approved facility
and she must then provide her consent (again in writing, stating date and time) to the procedure
before it may be performed (see Health Regulation (Matemat Health Information) Act 1998
(ACT) s 10).
III Ie. the later an abortion is performed, the more dangerous it is. See Stanley Henshaw and Jennifer
Van vort. 'Abortion Services in the United States, 1991 and 1992' (1994) 26 Family Plallning
Perspectives 100-6; Christopher Tietze and Stanley Henshaw, Induced Aburtion: A wortd Review
(1986) 97;' Report of the WlJrking Party 10 Examine the Adl!(/IWCY of Existing Services for ttie
Termination of Pregnancy in South Australia. South Australian Health Commission, Adelaide.
May 1986.75-6; J Miller. 'Medical Abortion in South Australia: A Critical Assessment of Early
Complications' (1973) I Medical Journal I?f Australia 825-30; John Lynxwiler and Michele
Wilson. 'A Case Study of Race Differences Among Late Abortion Patients' (1994) 2 [ Womell and
Heuith 43. 44.
81 Rankin, above n I, 25 I.
HJ Ibid 248.
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This Act substituted the old abortion ss 44-46 with a new s 44, titled 'Abortion _
abolition of common law offence', which stated as follows:
44. (I) Any rule of common law that creates an offence in relation to procuring
a woman's miscarriage is abrogated.
(2) This section expires 3 months after it commences.
(3) This section is a law to which the Legislation Act 2001, section 88 applies.
The substitution of the above s 44 effectively repeals the ancient abortion
.provisions to be found in ss 44, 45 and 46, while s 44(1) abolishes any common
law offence of abortion that might otherwise apply in the ACT. The combined
. effect of ss 44(2) and 44(3) is that since 9 December 2002, the above s 44 no
longer sits in the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT),'" but continues to have effect by virtue
of ss 88(1) and 88(2) of the Legislation Act 2001 (ACT). As it presently stands,
the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) makes no mention of ss 44 to 46, and jumps from
s 43 to s 47.
The removal of abortion from the realm of the criminal law has always been the
predominant objective of the pro-choice movement. After so much campaigning
and toil towards that goal, it seems somewhat strange that it could be achieved so
easily." Nonetheless, there it is: in one step the provisions of the Crimes Act 1900
(ACT) maintaining abortion as an offence are swept aside, and a further
guarantee is enacted under s 44(1) so that over-zealous prosecutors can have no
recourse to the common law. Simple, but very effective. As mentioned earlier,
from a pro-choice or women-centred perspective, this achievement is grand in
scale, which perhaps explains why it seems slightly hollow that victory may be
secured so simply: in essence the 2002 Act provides that all offences with respect
to abortion are expunged from the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) and the traditional
criminal law.
However, in the legal sphere rarely is anything quite that simple. Although
abortion is no longer expressly mentioned in the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) as a
result of (the now expired) s 44, there remain offences within the Crimes Act
1900 (ACT) that may affect the legality of some abortions. In particular, s 42
(and to a lesser extent s 43) appears to retain an influence on the upper time limit
for legal abortions. Section 42 creates the offence of 'child destruction'," which
operates 'in relation to a childbirth before the child is born alive'." Although at
first glance the use of the phrase 'in relation to a childbirth before the child is born
alive' suggests that the section operates outside the parameters of abortion, closer
scrutiny reveals that some methods of extremely late abortions might be
construed as involving 'childbirth'. Such abortions may therefore be unlawful
84 Ie. the new s 44 was inserted into the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) on the notification date of 9
September 2002, and so expired three months hence, as provided for by s 44(2).
85 By this I mean 'easy' from a legal, rather than a political, perspective.
86 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 43 deals with the offence of inflicting grievous bodily harm upon a
child.
S7 A similar phrase can be found in Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 43.
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under s 42. As a result, s 42 may operate to define an upper time limit for lawful
abortions.
As to the exact cut-off point for lawful abortions I would suggest that s 42 implies
that the upper time limit for lawful abortions in the ACT is viability. That is, the
use of the phrase 'in relation to a childbirth before the child is born alive' implies
that s 42 only operates with respect to an unborn child that is capable of being
born alive. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that it accords with the law
in other jurisdictions that continue to maintain an offence of child destruction."
The phrase 'child capable of being born alive' has been held to have substantially
the same meaning as 'viable.?" Thus, it is reasonable to infer that s 42 only
operates with respect to a viable child. Consequently, one may draw the
conclusion that viability appears to be the upper time limit for lawful abortions in
the ACT.
Of course, deciding that viability is the cut-off point for lawful abortions is not
particularly precise as 'viability' is a shifting standard, which changes with
advances in medical technology and practice." In 1969, the South Australian
Parliament considered that viability occurred at 28 weeks," whereas in recent
decisions various courts have held that a child at 26 weeks is viable." At the other
end of the spectrum, a Queensland court has held that a child at 21 weeks is not
viable." Thus, it may be said that viability is currently reached sometime
between 22 and 26 weeks," and certainly no later than 28 weeks gestation." This
accords with current practice, as most abortion service providers in Australia do
not provide abortions if the woman is over 22 weeks pregnant." This is the case
even in jurisdictions that expressly provide for a 28 week limit." The practical
rationale for such decisions is the fact that abortions performed after the second
trimester are far more dangerous."
88 For example. see Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 10. which limits the offence of child destruction to 'a
child capable of being born alive'. Also see Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 82A(7).
89 See C jI S [1987] I All ER 1230. 1240-3; and Rance v Mid-Downs Health Authority [1991] 1 QB
587,621-2.
90 Courts have recognised this fact, deciding that although a child may not have been viable until 28
weeks gestation in 1929 (the year in which the relevant UK legislation was enacted). it was highly
likely that viability would be reached much sooner in the late 20th century - see C v S [1987] I
All ER 1230. 1240.
91 See Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 82A(8).
92 See, ego Rance l' Mid-Downs Health Authority [19911 1 QB 587.616-17.
93 See R I' Bayliss and Cullen (1986) 9 Qld Lawyer Reps 8, 40.
9-1- This legal conclusion is backed up by medical evidence. For example, Mason makes the point that
22 weeks is the earliest point at which viability could be said [0 be reached as it is the earliest point
at which a child could breathe. See J K Mason, Medico-Legal Aspects of Reproduction and
Parenthood (1990) 104.
<)5 Indeed, no Australian jurisdiction allows lawful abortions beyond 28 weeks, unless it is a case of
medical emergency whereby the mother's life is in danger or her health is seriously threatened by
the continuance of the pregnancy.
9t. See Pregnancy Advisory Centre, Mark J Rankin. and Natasha Cica. 'Law and Practice of Abortion
in Australia', in Pregnancy Advisory Centre (edj. Information Pack for Students and Health
\¥tJrkers interested ill Abortion (1999) 3, 3-7.
97 For example. the Pregnancy Advisory Centre, which performs most abortions in South Australia,
has a policy of only performing abortions up until 20 weeks, despite the fact that the South
Australian legislation allows lawful abortions up until 28 weeks of pregnancy.
9H See National Health and Medical Research Council, above n 3, 13.
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However, a desire to be rid of an unwanted pregnancy is hardly satisfied by
reference to such concerns. Indeed, given the torture of an unwanted pregnancy,
there exists a strong argument in favour of allowing abortions at any stage of
pregnancy." It would, T imagine, seem quite absurd to a woman seeking an
abortion to be told that she cannot legally obtain one as she is 22 weeks pregnant,
but if she had approached the abortion service provider when she was only 21
weeks pregnant, she would no longer be pregnant. Such advice would be
devastating.
Unfortunately for women who find themselves in this position, to suggest that the
law should be further reformed, so as to allow abortions on demand at any stage
of pregnancy, would be political suicide, as many members of our society would
have a strong stance against such action (whether logically justified or not), and
the anti-choice movement would probably take the opportunity to erode reforms
already achieved. Thus, although abortions in the ACT are (probably) only
lawful until viability, and therefore the purist may say that the ultimate goal of
totallegalisation is yet to be achieved, it is a flaw within the system that those of
us who advocate choice will just have to live with for the time being.
Furthermore, it should not, in any meaningful way, take away from the
achievement of the ACT Parliament in passing the 2002 legislation which (with
the viability exception discussed immediately above), removes abortion from the
realm of the criminal law.
The 2002 Act that provided for the abolition of the offence of abortion was
followed with the repeal of the 1998 Act regulating the medical profession. '00
This was achieved by the passing of the Health Regulation (Maternal Health
Information) Repeal Act 2002 (ACT). Indeed, as the 1998 Act (although
professing otherwise) clearly raised criminal issues with respect to abortion, it
was necessary to repeal this Act in order to complete the legalisation process.
Of course, in repealing the 1998 Act, the ACT Parliament created a legal void with
respect to abortion, This void was filled by further legislative reform, namely
making amendments to the Medical Practitioners Act 1930 (ACT), by passing the
Medical Practitioners (Maternal Health) Amendment Act 2002 (ACT), which
inserted a new 'Part 48' into the Medical Practitioners Act 1930 (ACT).
VII THE NEW REGIME
Part 48 of the Medical Practitioners Act 1930 (ACT), consists of ss 55A, 55B,
55C, 55D, and 55E, and provides for the medical regulation of abortion in the
ACT. In common with the other legislative reforms of 2002, this medicalisation
of abortion was achieved efliciently. The effect of pt 4B of the Medical
99 See Laurie Nsiah-Jefferson, 'Reproductive Laws, Women of Color. and Low-Income Women'
(1989) II Hhmell's Rights Law Reporter 15, 15-30, in which she convincingly proves her point
that law restricting late abortions will continue to have a particular impact on poor women and
women of colour.
IOU Note that all of the majorreform Acts were passed simultaneously, with the same notification date
of 9 September 2002 (ie. Acts 24, 25 and 26 of 2002).
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Practitioners Act 1930 (ACT) is that abortions in the ACT must be performed in
an approved facility'?' by a registered medical practitioner.'?'
Unfortunately, this medicalisation of abortion is achieved at the cost of re-
criminalising certain abortions. That is, under pt 4_B a failure to perform an
abortion in an approved medical facility carries a possible penalty of
imprisonment for six months,"? while a person who performs an abortion who is
not a registered medical practitioner is liable to be imprisoned for five years. 1M
Clearly, penalties of imprisonment carry definite connotations of criminality.
This is both unfortunate and unnecessary.
Sections SSB and SSC of the Medical Practitioners Act 1930 (ACT) effectively
create new offences, namely: (1) performing abortions in non-approved facilities;
and (2) the performance of an abortion by anyone other than a registered medial
practitioner. This re-criminalisation of certain abortions is cause for concern,
however like the case of viability referred to above, it is difficult to express this
state of affairs as a major problem in the current political and social climate. That
is, the medical profession possess a tax-payer funded monopoly with respect to
. the provision of a number of health services; abortion is simply no exception. It
is also standard practice to label as criminal any health professionals acting
outside the medical professions' monopoly; again, abortion is no exception. Put
simply, the medical profession in Australia is a very successful 'profession'. lOS
Consequently, the profession's' monopoly with respect to certain services,
including abortion, is likely to continue into the foreseeable future. There seems
to be neither the political will, nor the social offensive, to change this state of
affairs, and provided there are sufficient members of the medical profession
prepared to perform abortions, the maintenance of the medical monopoly is not
cause for great alarm.
The more immediate concern may be the creation of an offence with respect to
abortions not performed in an approved medical facility, as approval under s 55D
is granted by the Minister. Fortunately s 55D(3) makes it clear that the 'Minister
must not unreasonably refuse or delay a request for approval of a medical
facility', and it would appear that the only test the Minister should direct hislher
mind to in reaching a decision in this respect is whether or not a medical facility
is 'suitable on medical grounds for carrying out abortions'J" Auspiciously, this
101 See Medical Practitioners Act 1930 (ACT) s SSe.
102 See Medical Practitioners Act 1930 (ACT) s 55B.
10) See Medical Practitioners Act 1930 (ACT) s 55e.
104 See Medical Practitioners Act 1930 (ACT) s 55B. Note: under the terms of a new Bill currently
before the ACT Parliament this penalty for non-medical practitioners is extended to life
imprisonment. See the proposed -CrimesAmendment Bill 2002 (ACT) s 42A(2).
lOS Without going into unnecessary detail, I take the goal of 'professions' to be the monopoly of
specific markets, and I believe that the medical profession are especially successful in this respect.
For support of this view see Eliot Freidson, Profession of Medicine: A Study of the Sociology of
Applied Knowledge (1970); Eliot Freidson, Professional Dominance: The Social Structure of
Health Care (1970); Eliot Preidson and Judith Lorber, Medical Men and their Work (1972); Euan
Willis, Medical Dominance: The Division of Labour ill Australian Health Care (1989); Noel Parry
and Joseph Parry, The Rise of the Medical Profession (1976).
106 See Medical Practitioners Act 1930 (ACf) s 55D(1).
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approval process seems to be operating well, with five approvals thus far
granted.:"
The final provision of note is s 55E, which contains the standard conscientious
objector clauses, allowing people 'to refuse to assist in carrying out an abortion', lOS
and making it clear that 'no-one is under a duty (by contract or by statutory or
other legal requirement) to carry out or assist in carrying out an abortion.'!" Such
clauses can be criticised as inconsistent with the medical professions' oath of
assistance in all cases, but as many individuals have a resistance to abortion based
on religious or moral grounds there also exist strong arguments in favour of the
inclusion of such clauses. This is especially the case given that such clauses do
not alleviate a medical practitionerfrom hislher duty to provide advice, or to refer
a patient to another practitioner, but are simply confined to the operation itself.
Furthermore, according to the medical profession's ethical code, if the woman's
life was threatenedassistance would have to be provided irrespective of any such
objections. Thus, all in all, the effect of these clauses is not profound, and may
merely be viewed as a recognition and acceptance of the diverse views held on
the subject of abortion.
In summary, it is clear from the above that the ACT is the only jurisdiction in
Australia that in any meaningful way satisfies the commendable policy goals of
the Women's Electoral Lobby: (1) the removal of abortion from the criminal
codes; and (2) the regulation of the practice under health law,"? Although the
process is not complete, the ACT Parliament have moved towards accepting
women as full moral persons, as it has come some way to recognising (albeit
incompletely) that women have 'the right to make their own decisions about their
own bodies.'!"
Despite the fact that abortion is not entirely removed from the realm of the
criminal law (which is essential if women are to possess a right to abortion), in
that post-viability abortions; abortions not performed by a registered medical
practitioner; and abortions not performed in an approved medical facility remain
unlawful, it is possible to say that the ACT Parliament have achieved the most
that can be realistically hoped for in contemporary Australia. With the exceptions
mentioned immediately above, the ACT Parliament has removed abortion from
the criminal code and from the common law, and has provided for the medical
regulation of the practice. On the condition that abortions are performed pre-
viability, and by registered medical practitioners in approved facilities, there now
exists effective abortion-on-demand in the ACT.
Of course, this legalisation and simultaneous medicalisation of abortion does not
grant any rights to women. However, in addition to providing obvious practical
107The requisite approval must be in writing and such approval is a notifiable instrument (Medical
Practitioners Act 1930 (ACT) s 55D(2), thus one can keep track of the number of approvals.
108 Medical Practitioners Act 1930 (ACT) s 55E(2).
109 Medical Practitioners Act 1930 (ACT) s 55E(I).
110 See Editorial, (2003) Women's Electoral Lobby (WEL) Australia Inc <hltp://www.wel.org.au/
policyIOOpoI3.htm#Abortion>at 7 April 2003.
1t I Rankin, above n I, 252.
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benefits, the 2002 reforms leave space for women to make their own decisions
(within certain parameters) with respect to 'abortion, as they do not have to
surmount the hurdle of the legal tests that exist in other jurisdictions, Although
women in the ACT are not completely granted the power to make their own
decisions about their bodies, by removing abortion from the criminal law, an
essential step has been taken towards this goal.!" As previously stated, 'while
abortion remains a subject for Australian criminal law, it can never be a right
possessed by Australian women.'!"
The ACT has made headway in this respect, and the current ACT regime is the
most we can presently hope for in the short-term. The 2002 reforms therefore
deserve our praise, and indeed our protection. This last point requires emphasis
as anti-choice advocates are unlikely to rest until the law reverts back to its
draconian origins. We must therefore protect the ACT achievement and
campaign for other jurisdictions to follow. The ACT Parliament has lighted the
way towards abortion being a right, and has therefore taken a crucial and essential
step towards the recognition of reproductive freedom; the feminist utopia. Of
course, reproductive freedom remains a distant dream for Australian women, but
the ACT Parliament, by virtue of the 2002 reforms, has brought that dream into
sharper focus.
112See Petersen, above n 25, 271; Crowley-Cyr, above n 27, 257·8; Teresa Libesman and Vani
Sripathy (eds), YOJ/r Body YOllr Baby: Women's Legal Rights/rom Conception to Birth (1996) 42;
Natasha Cica. 'The Inadequacies of Australian Abortion Law' (1991) 5 Australian Journal of
Family Law 37, 66; Davies. above n 27,109; McLean, above n 27, 227; McDonnell, above n 27,
126-30.
II) Rankin, above n 1, 252.
